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I. INTRODUCTION: FREE RADIO SAN DIEGO
Free Radio San Diego (FRSD) broadcasted on 96.9 FM and served the
San Diego area beginning in October 2002.1 Locally owned and operated,
FRSD’s listeners preferred the station’s diverse programming to heavy
rotation, commercial-filled2 corporate radio alternatives.3 On the morning
of July 21, 2005, station fans expected to hear FRSD founder and
morning DJ “Bob Ugly”4 talking local politics, playing commercial-free
rock music, or rallying support for the upcoming “San Diego Day”
picnic. Unfortunately, at 9:51 a.m., FRSD’s signal abruptly cut out and never
returned.5 Listeners logging on to the FRSD Web site were similarly
unable to listen to the show’s streaming Internet simulcast. The station’s
service was silenced.
Free Radio San Diego’s July 21 broadcast disruption came courtesy of
an early morning, unannounced Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) raid on FRSD headquarters. Armed with an in rem arrest warrant
and accompanied by U.S. Marshals, FCC agents stormed FRSD’s
apartment broadcasting location, disassembled their antennae, and seized

1. Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, About Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM (Aug. 4,
2004), http://www.pirate969.org/ (select About FRSD) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
2. Studies show that twelve to sixteen minutes of every hour are filled by
commercials on most radio stations. Daniel J. Rapela, An Analysis of the Effects of
Consolidation on the Radio Industry (Dec. 2, 1999) (unpublished thesis, Gannon
University) available at http://mmstudio.gannon.edu/~gabriel/rapela.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2006).
3. Other San Diego stations playing similar mixes of pop, punk, and rock music
include Rock 105.3 (KIOZ-FM) and Classic Rock 101 KGB (KGB FM). Clear Channel,
http://www.clearchannel.com/Radio/StationSearch.aspx (search San Diego) (last visited
June 21, 2006). Each of these stations is owned by Clear Channel Communications, a
media conglomerate controlling nine stations in San Diego, id., and over 1200 stations
across the United States. Clear Channel Radio Sales, http://www.clearchannelradiosales.
com/About.html (last visited June 21, 2006). Another alternative rock station, FM 94.9,
is owned by Lincoln Financial Media, a large media company owning three radio stations in
San Diego and over twenty media outlets in the United States. Lincoln Financial Media,
http://www. lincolnfinancialmedia.com/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
4. “Bob Ugly” is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the station operator.
See, e.g., Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, http://www.pirate969.org/ (select FAQ).
5. This Author, listening to 96.9 FM on the morning in question, noted the time
the station ceased operating.
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computers and transmitting equipment.6 Despite open bandwidth and a
loyal audience, FRSD did not possess an FCC license to broadcast on
96.9 MHz. Lacking a license, Bob Ugly, a so-called pirate radio broadcaster,
operated against a regulatory backdrop allowing the FCC to seize and
forfeit broadcasting equipment, imprison station managers, or both.7
Coming on the heels of occasional FCC notices, Bob Ugly himself
expected a formal confrontation with the FCC sooner or later.8 But
before he could confront the FCC in court, FRSD’s broadcasting
equipment was seized and forfeited to the United States Government.
At the heart of the FRSD seizure is a statute giving the United States
ownership over the entire natural spectrum usable for radio transmission.9
The surrounding regulatory framework provides that private parties
wishing to transmit information over the spectrum must do so with the
blessing of an FCC license.10 Despite Bob Ugly’s best efforts, he was
unable to obtain the requisite license to broadcast.11 Undaunted, he
6. Joe Hughes & Frank Green, Agents Raid, Shut Down Unlicensed Free Radio,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 22, 2005, at B1.
7. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (2000).
8. Kelly Davis, No License, No Problem: Pirate Radio Station Plans to
Rebuild After Raid, SAN DIEGO CITY BEAT, July 27, 2005, available at http://www.
sdcitybeat.com/article.php?id=3391 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). In an interview with
San Diego City Beat a few weeks before the FCC raid took place, Bob Ugly commented
that FRSD staged a benefit concert to raise money for replacement equipment “when
[the FCC decides] to greet us with a battering ram.” Scoop Stevens, Locals Only:
Notes from the Local Music Scene, SAN DIEGO CITY BEAT, June 29, 2005, available at
http://www.sdcitybeat.com/ article.php?id=3300 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
10. Id. This power is based in the Commerce Clause, even though radio station
signals often do not reach across state lines. See United States v. Ganley, 300 F. Supp.
2d 200, 202 (D. Me. 2004) (rejecting this federalism-based argument where the station’s
transmission was limited to one state). The Supreme Court has held that all radio signals
are interstate by nature. Fisher’s Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 297 U.S. 650,
655 (1936). Given the Court’s recent Commerce Clause analysis in Gonzales v. Raich,
125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005), further federalism attacks on § 301 are likely to be futile.
11. Bob Ugly has chronicled his efforts to obtain a low power license to broadcast
in the San Diego area. See Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, supra note 1. Using the
FCC’s Web-based “Channel Finder” and typing in the coordinates for FRSD’s original
Golden Hill broadcasting site, the Channel Finder returns information that the
coordinates “cannot be used to apply for a low power broadcast station on ANY FM
channel due to interference caused to authorized FM broadcast stations. As a result, an
application for this site for a [Low Power FM] station cannot be accepted for
processing.” Id. Bob Ugly wryly notes that, despite the claim of potential interference,
the FCC had no problem granting Global Radio, Inc. airtime on 96.9 MHz during the
Super Bowl. See id.; FCC Grants “Experimental FM Application” for Super Bowl, 560
THE CGC COMMUNICATOR, Feb. 4, 2003, http://www.bext.com/CGC/2003/cgc560.htm.
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found a slice of open radio spectrum and started broadcasting anyway.
Although his broadcasts did not interfere with licensed broadcasters,
Bob Ugly and those like him who do not, or cannot, receive a
broadcasting license break federal law and risk having their equipment
seized and forfeited to the United States without prior judicial notice.12
Despite these risks, pirate radio operators perceive a need for
community-oriented broadcasting and establish unlicensed stations in
communities across the United States.13 For FRSD, the local reaction
thus far had been overwhelmingly positive: listener donations kept the
station afloat, and the station had never received any complaints, official
or otherwise, about interference or programming.14 In establishing
FRSD, Bob Ugly dreamed of providing his community with a locally
oriented, commercial-free alternative to mainstream radio; he did not set
out to chance a felony conviction and lose thousands of dollars worth of
broadcasting equipment.15
As applied to non-interfering pirate broadcasters like FRSD, enforcing
licensing requirements with ex parte forfeiture conflicts with current
FCC regulatory theory and Supreme Court jurisprudence. Congress has
authorized the FCC to use the Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure,
Admiralty, and Maritime Rules16 to seize property of suspected pirate
radio operators.17 Succinctly, a one-sided18 showing of probable cause
that a radio operator transmits without a license19 allows the government

12. Congress authorized the United States to broadly seize “[a]ny electronic,
electromagnetic, radio-frequency, or similar device, or component thereof, used, sent,
carried, manufactured, assembled, possessed, offered for sale, sold, or advertised with
willful and knowing intent to violate section 301 or 302a of this title . . . .” 47 U.S.C.
§ 510.
13. Michael Aguilar, Note, Micro Radio: A Small Step in the Return to Localism,
Diversity, and Competitiveness in Broadcasting, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1133, 1169 (1999).
14. Interview by KPBS Radio’s Tom Fudge with Bob Ugly, Program Director and
DJ at Free Radio San Diego, and Dennis Wharton, Senior VP of Corporate
Communications for the National Association of Broadcasters, in San Diego, California.
(July 28, 2005), available at http://stream.publicbroadcasting.net/production/mp3/kpbs/
local-kpbs-478387.mp3 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Tom Fudge Interview].
15. Id.
16. The Supplemental Rules were originally promulgated to satisfy maritime liens.
Due to the inherent exigencies involved, the Supplemental Rules provide less procedural
due process than otherwise provided by normal civil forfeiture law. Gregory C.
Buffalow, The Annotated Rules B and C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 543, 54344 (2002).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 510.
18. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ex parte as: “Done or made at the instance and
for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person
adversely interested . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (8th ed. 2004).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. C(2) allows seizure for violations of federal statutes.
Broadcasting without a license violates 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
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to silence the broadcast by seizing the offending property.20 Although
most courts disfavor no-notice seizures,21 the FCC uses the
Supplemental Rules to seize personal property without showing “exigent

20. Accordingly, the typical pirate radio raid does not seek to arrest pirate radio
broadcasters. Rather, the seizure constitutes an important step in an in rem action
designed to silence broadcasting through forfeiture of the instrumentalities alleged to
violate the law. See 47 U.S.C. § 510. Notice is not required, and the government may
obtain a writ of entry and arrest warrant upon a showing of probable cause. See id.; see,
e.g., United States v. One (1) 1966 Beechcraft Baron, No. N242BS, 788 F.2d 384, 387
(6th Cir. 1986) (describing the probable cause standard for governmental forfeitures).
Typically, the government demonstrates probable cause by submitting a verified
complaint accompanied by an engineer’s affidavit alleging violations of 47 U.S.C. § 301,
the statute requiring a license to broadcast. FED. R. CIV. P. C(4), (6); see, e.g., United
States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 218 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir.
2000) (establishing probable cause by filing a complaint accompanied by engineer
Viglione’s affidavit which alleged 47 U.S.C. § 301 violations); United States v. Any &
All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (establishing
violations through the “Loginow Affidavit”). These instances deal with establishing
probable cause at trial. Technically, under the Supplemental Rules, the clerk of the court
must issue a warrant in response to a verified complaint alleging a violation of a federal
statute. FED. R. CIV. P. C(3)(a)(i). In practice, however, the government will usually use
affidavits establishing probable cause and get the arrest warrant signed by a magistrate
judge. The verified complaint is filed under seal and, unlike most civil forfeiture
proceedings, exigent circumstances need not be shown. Id.
Armed with a writ of entry and in rem arrest warrant, U.S. Marshals and FCC agents
raid the suspected broadcasting location and seize the equipment. Typically, these raids
are carried out with minor disruption of the public peace. However, local opinion often
runs with the pirate operators and against government interference in what the
community views as a valuable public service. For example, sixty protesters contributed
to a tense operation when the FCC raided Free Radio Santa Cruz and FCC vehicles had
to be towed from the scene after their tires were slashed. Cathy Redfern, Pirate Radio
Station Unplugged, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, Sept. 30, 2004, available at http://www.
santacruzsentinel.com/archive/2004/September/30/local/stories/01local.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2006).
After seizure, the Rules mandate publication of notice and require parties claiming an
interest in the property to file a statement of interest before filing an answer. FED. R.
CIV. P. C(4), (6). Assuming that the pirate radio operator/claimant timely files his
statement of interest and answer, new hurdles surface once he appears in court to contest
the forfeiture. For example, some courts employing the primary jurisdiction doctrine
refuse jurisdiction over a claimant’s defenses if based on constitutional grounds. See
United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2000) (maintaining that these
challenges can only be brought in a Court of Appeals following an FCC order). As
explained in Part IV, the primary jurisdiction doctrine is a significant roadblock for
pirate operators who wish to challenge the regulatory scheme. See infra text
accompanying notes 157-59.
21. See, e.g., United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d
896, 903-04 (2d. Cir. 1992) (noting the potential for government abuse of ex parte
seizure, such as a “dry run” to test the strength of a potential criminal conviction).
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circumstances” like interference complaints or safety hazards.22 The
practice warrants a critical look that considers the core regulatory functions
of the FCC, a changed media landscape, and evolving Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
Part II of this Comment describes how FCC regulatory policy has
shifted from the “public trust” model to a privately driven approach. Ex
parte seizure of non-interfering pirate radio equipment does not match
current FCC regulatory theory and works against traditional “public
interest” factors. Part III analyzes new FCC policy towards Low Power
FM and suggests that the Supreme Court develop fresh precedent to
keep pace. Part IV addresses Fourth Amendment concerns by exploring
alternate enforcement methods and proposing more reasonable
approaches to license enforcement. Finally, Part V analyzes the Due
Process implications of ex parte seizures under the Supreme Court’s
Mathews23 framework. Under Parts IV and V, the emergence of dual
use technology has made ex parte seizure a riskier play from the
government’s perspective.
II. THE FCC’S REGULATORY PEDIGREE
A. Government Spectrum Ownership and Early Regulation
Radio first became popular in the early twentieth century as a safety
feature for ships to communicate with each other.24 After amateur
operators began interfering with business and government use, Congress
passed the Radio Act of 1912, the first serious attempt to regulate the
airwaves and ensure that radio developed into a useful medium.25 The

22. FED. R. CIV. P. C(3)(a)(i). If the seizure is challenged, courts will analyze the
seizure under the Supreme Court’s Mathews test. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334-35 (1976). Most courts justify the seizure with an ex post determination that
exigent circumstances did exist. See infra Part V.
23. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
24. Gregory M. Prindle, Note, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has
Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 279, 284 (2003). Even before the Radio Act of 1912, infra note 25, the
Wireless Ship Act of 1910 forbade any steamer licensed or carrying more than fifty
persons to leave port unless equipped with a radio and skilled operator. Nat’l Broad. Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 (1943).
25. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed in 1932). Interestingly, the
Act did not regulate radio stations operating entirely within the borders in one state,
provided they did not interfere with interstate transmissions. Id. at 302. The Secretary’s
first years under the Act were quiet: problems of interference arose infrequently because
few radio operators broadcasted on an open spectrum. See Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at
210. World War I, however, accelerated the development of radio and the new media
spread rapidly across America. Id. at 210-11. By 1925, there were almost six hundred
radio stations across America and 175 applications for new stations. Id. at 211.
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Act accorded the Secretary of Commerce vague, undefined power to
grant licenses regulating the frequencies, times, and locations of
broadcasts.26 As the usable spectrum27 filled up, greater instances of
interference sparked debate on which broadcaster had the right to be
heard. In 1926, courts and judicial officers became concerned about the
Secretary of Commerce’s unbridled discretion to regulate these rights,28
and the Act of 1912 was abandoned. Without any legislation regulating
the broadcast spectrum, chaos ensued as broadcasters transmitted
indiscriminately across frequencies.29 Recognizing the great public
value in radio, President Coolidge urgently recommended enactment of
new legislation.30 The goal was to develop the broadcast spectrum into a
communication medium useful for public and private information
transmission.
The Radio Act of 1927 created an administrative agency, the Federal
Radio Commission (FRC), authorized to license and regulate radio in
accordance with the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”31 Most
significantly, the 1927 Act made clear what the 1912 legislation assumed:
the government owned the broadcast spectrum, private ownership was
impossible, and use of the spectrum could occur only with the
government’s permission.32 Permission took the form of a license,
26. See 37 Stat. at 34.
27. The laws of nature limit the amount of information one can transmit through
the air. For a discussion of the technical and physical aspects of radio in layman’s terms,
see Arthur Martin, Comment, Which Public, Whose Interest? The FCC, the Public
Interest, and Low-Power Radio, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1159, 1162-64 (2001).
28. Counterintuitively, the Secretary lacked the power to deny licenses. See
Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923), However, with more
prospective operators than available frequencies, the Secretary could control the power
and operations of stations by ordering frequency sharing. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at
211. After a federal court cast doubt on the Secretary’s nonreviewable discretion,
Attorney General William Donovan denied the Secretary much of his presumed power of
regulation. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
See generally 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 126, 129-32 (1926). Reviewing the enacting legislation,
Donovan determined that Congress did not originally intend to delegate broad regulatory
powers to the Secretary. Id. at 129.
29. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212. Almost two hundred new radio stations
went on the air, and indiscriminate frequency use across limited bandwidth led to interference
and unintelligible broadcasts. See id.
30. Id. (citing MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO.
69-483, at 10 (2d Sess. 1926)).
31. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632-69, §4, 1162 Stat. 1163-64 (1927)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a)-(d), 309(a), 310, 312).
32. THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 12 (1994). Krattenmaker and Powe also state “[w]hen the Titanic sank
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granted for free, but for no more than three years.33 Although the
comprehensive Communications Act of 1934 replaced the FRC with the
modern-day FCC, most of the administrative agency’s regulatory
functions and powers remained intact.34 For consistency, this Comment
will always refer to the FCC though earlier analysis might actually refer
to the FRC.
B. “Scarcity” Justifies Government Ownership and Regulation
Once radio progressed past the developmental stage, two things
became clear: (1) radio was a mass communications medium which
could broadcast information ranging from military orders to baseball
games over great distances;35 and (2) the laws of nature limited the
number of usable frequencies.36 Two or more broadcasters transmitting
on the same frequency created interference; that is, each message
destructed the other and neither broadcaster could be heard intelligibly.37
The term “scarcity” characterized this limitation and provided the historical
basis for government ownership and regulation.38 If the number of
broadcasters exceeded the scarce number of usable frequencies, certain
broadcasters needed a recognized right of transmission to ensure radio
remained a reliable means of communication. After claiming absolute
ownership over the broadcast spectrum, the government vested this right
in some broadcasters by awarding a license.
The Supreme Court’s National Broadcasting Corporation39 (NBC)
decision acknowledged the scarcity rationale’s effects on the freedom of
speech.40 Because of scarcity, the specter of debilitating interference
justified government ownership of a medium used almost exclusively to
communicate information.41 Although all mediums are scarce,42 radio
[in 1912], the United States government seized control of the airwaves.” Id. at 5. The
authors discuss the interference caused by amateur radio operators spreading rumors that
prevented emergency information from reaching other vessels. Id.
33. Id. at 12. Licenses are no longer free. If two people compete for a license, the
FCC auctions the license to the highest bidder. See Federal Communications
Commission, About Auctions, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about
auctions&page=1 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
34. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2000)).
35. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 5-7.
36. STAN GIBILISCO, HANDBOOK OF RADIO AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 547-48
(1999).
37. THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR 74 (1996).
38. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
39. Id. at 190.
40. See id. at 213.
41. Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First
Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 31-32 (2002). Benjamin sets up a number of
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could not be efficiently exploited through private ownership because
“ordinary individuals applying ordinary concepts could not understand
how broadcasting operate[d] or control its consequences. . . .”43 Because of
the spectrum’s unique qualities, utilizing this “government property” to
transmit information carried concomitant restrictions on First Amendment
rights.44 For the sake of reliability, the FCC could impose licensing
restrictions on otherwise legal speech if the speaker wanted to disseminate
his message over a complicated and scarce government resource.
interesting hypotheticals which compare the regulation of radio spectrum to the
regulation of newspapers. Id. at 26-31. To Benjamin, any radio regulation necessarily
implicates the First Amendment because the radio spectrum is almost entirely used to
communicate information. Id. at 31. The “spectrum” lacks an independent significance
because it is only useful to send information from one point to another. Id. at 31-32; cf.
Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for
the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 610 (1997) (discussing the spectrum’s
independent value as a “public resource” to be managed by “public trustees”
broadcasting for the good of the community) (citing The Federal Radio Commission and
the Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees,11 FED. COMM. B.J. 5, 14
(1950)).
42. For example, one could not publish two newspapers on the same piece of paper
without rendering both unreadable. See Benjamin, supra note 41, at 40 (“Lower courts
and scholars—and even the FCC at one point—have forcefully contended that the
scarcity affecting spectrum is no different from the scarcity affecting newsprint or
printing presses.”). For example, printing presses are not subject to licensing
requirements which determine who can and cannot publish. Id. at 28. From a First
Amendment standpoint, information on the printed page receives constitutional protection
while the same information transmitted over an unlicensed frequency does not.
43. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 35.
44. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 226. Although Justice Frankfurter’s First
Amendment discussion involves one paragraph of a forty-page opinion, id., the powerful
language therein provides language necessary to rebuff freedom of speech arguments in
pirate radio seizures. See, e.g., U.S. v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip.,
218 F.3d 543, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Because [pirate operator] Perez does not have a
First Amendment right to broadcast his views on an unlicensed radio station, this
argument does not present a defense to forfeiture.”); U.S. v. Any & All Radio Station
Transmission Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (similar). Justice
Frankfurter stated that “[t]he right of free speech does not include . . . the right to use the
facilities of radio without a license.” Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 227. Finding that
Congress accepted the scarcity rationale when enacting the Radio Act of 1927, Justice
Frankfurter conceded that if Congress authorized the Commission to choose among
applicants based upon political, economic, or social views, the issue would be “wholly
different.” Id. at 226. Regardless, without a license providing First Amendment
protection, any unlicensed broadcaster lost a formidable shield against government
intrusion. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the Supreme
Court upheld the FCC’s ability to prohibit licensed broadcasters from airing indecent
language over radio. See id. at 748-51. Constitutional Law expert Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky calls the result “troubling.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1000-01 (2d ed. 2002).
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Although critiques of the scarcity rationale date back at least forty-five
years,45 scarcity provided a sufficient justification for government spectrum
ownership in 1927. Already an indispensable military intelligence tool,46
the government then held the largest stake in developing reliable, orderly
broadcasting as quickly as possible.47 As thousands of amateur broadcasters
drifted across various frequencies, embroiling the government in common
law disputes for every frequency violation would have been costly and
inefficient.48 Since lay people, including judges,49 had trouble understanding
the mechanics of radio transmission,50 applying common law property
principles may not have produced consistent results.51 Because radio
45. Krattenmaker credits economist Ronald Coase as the first to examine the
scarcity rationale’s holes. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 14. The scarcity
rationale’s critics argue that broadcasting’s unique characteristics justify regulation only
inasmuch to preserve the technical integrity of radio. Krattenmaker argues that any
regulations, such as content regulations, falling outside technical regulations should be
subject to First Amendment criticisms. Id. at 55. In other words, broadcasters should
enjoy the same protections afforded to “publishers, street speakers, or performing
artists.” Id. The FCC’s modern distancing from the scarcity doctrine to justify nontechnical, content-based regulations appears to lend these arguments some weight. See
Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 41, at 633 (“The FCC itself recognized by 1987 when
it repealed the Fairness Doctrine that scarcity could no longer justify content
regulation.”).
46. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 5-7.
47. See id.
48. Krattenmaker suggests that common law doctrines would have been
inadequate because many state courts would be responsible for enforcing these doctrines.
See id. at 17. This presents a problem because most broadcasting crosses state lines. See
id. Also, common law would soon have to differentiate between new technologies. Id.
at 16-17. But see Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 149 (1990) (arguing that interference disputes
were being adequately settled under the common law prior to government spectrum
ownership). Although Hazlett makes a good point for the common law settling private
disputes, interference with official military transmissions arguably has higher
consequences. Reserving a guaranteed slice of spectrum for government use ensures that
communiqués can always be heard in case of emergency or national security.
49. Justice Frankfurter wrote several of the early, important decisions upholding
FCC regulations. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 190; FCC v. Pottsville Broad.
Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). His opinions set the tone for a broad mandate of regulatory
power under the “public interest” standard, and his repeated references to the “rapid
pace” of technical innovation characterize his great deference to FCC decisionmaking
ability. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 29-31.
50. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 30-31, 34.
51. See supra note 48. To this day, many credible arguments exist as to whether
the radio spectrum is property unto itself, or nothing more than the information which it
carries. Benjamin insists that since the spectrum is only usable to transmit information,
the property/speech distinction collapses back into itself. See Benjamin, supra note 41,
at 31-32. That is, the spectrum only exists insofar as people use it to transmit
information. This has tremendous implications under First Amendment analysis, as
purposefully keeping spectrum idle could be seen as stifling the flow of information
otherwise transmissible on that spectrum. See STREETER, supra note 37, at 219-22
(discussing the difference between physical property constructions like streets and
ethereal radio broadcasting); Benjamin, supra note 41, at 31-32. For a comprehensive
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was a booming though poorly understood technology, initial government
ownership was necessary to protect important government interests and
add some semblance of order to the radio dial. Although imperfect, the
scarcity rationale sufficiently justified spectrum ownership to ensure the
new communication medium developed quickly and reliably.
C. Congress Appoints the FCC to Regulate in the “Public Interest”
Once scarcity justified government ownership, congressional mandates
allowed the FCC to manage the new property extensively. Specifically,
Congress broadly authorized the FCC to license and regulate broadcasters
in accordance with the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”52
Critics have likened the vague “public interest” standard to a “blank
check” of administrative power.53 Some even suggest the mandate violates
the Nondelegation Doctrine.54 However, like the scarcity doctrine, the
public interest mandate must be understood against its historical
backdrop. Early FCC public interest theory was similar to that underlying
regulation of the nascent airline industry: to promote public appreciation,
the government heavily regulated new technology at the expense of
private interests.55 Because broadcasting’s technology was tough to
grasp, an “expert commission” like the FCC needed broad discretion to
oversee radio’s formative years.56 Like Congress, the Supreme Court
also afforded the FCC much latitude in decisionmaking. Fears of
congressional and judicial meddling permeated early Court decisions,
and nearly all FCC regulations were upheld under the public interest

discussion of various property rights theories applied to the radio spectrum, see
STREETER, supra note 37, at 219-55.
52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. To date, Congress has directed or
authorized the FCC to act in the public interest in nearly one hundred statutory
provisions. See Randolph May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate To
Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427 app. A (2001).
53. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 34.
54. See generally May, supra note 52.
55. For example, certain airlines were forced to fly unprofitable routes to ensure
that cutthroat competition did not undermine the safety or economic stability of the
industry. Heavy regulation was one way of assuring that the industry operated
efficiently and with the greatest good for the greatest number of Americans, although at
the price of subverting the free market. Asif Siddiqi, Air Transportation: Deregulation
and Its Consequences, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Commercial_Aviation/
Dereg/Tran8.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
56. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
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standard.57 Over the last seventy years, the FCC has come to define the
public interest standard as the promotion of competition, diversity, and
localism in the marketplace.58
Early FCC doctrine eschewed private interests59 and treated the
broadcast spectrum like a public utility.60 Licenses to communicate over
the scarce public spectrum were free; however, heavy regulation ensured
privileged licensees would operate in a manner benefiting the listening
public. When deciding which licenses should be renewed, the FCC
looked anew at how listeners would benefit from fresh programming.61
License incumbents received little protection; the fresh public interest
determination did not account for “sunk costs” and the FCC would even
award airtime to a competitor.62
The public trust theory, applied to radio regulation, was inherently
democratic: using the spectrum to communicate advanced liberty by
fostering an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” 63 The FCC thought the
marketplace was best served by a diverse range of programming reflecting
local broadcasters. For example, fearing that network media consolidation64
threatened the public interest, the FCC promulgated “Chain Broadcasting
Regulations” in response to rising consolidation in station ownership.65
These regulations promoted localism by, among other things, allowing

57. See generally id. at 145-46 (upholding FCC regulations against attack); Nat’l
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-27 (1943) (same).
58. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 43; Jill K. Howard, Congress Errs
in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership Caps, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 269 (1997).
59. See, e.g., KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C.
Cir. 1931) (denying licensing when broadcasting was used primarily for private profit).
60. Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 41, at 610.
61. See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 62 F.2d 850, 85152 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (holding the FRC’s denial of relicensing proper because the
incumbent licensee did not operate his station in the public interest).
62. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940).
63. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); cf. Minneapolis
Star v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (“[A]n informed public is
the essence of a working democracy.”).
64. “Networks” were, and are, stations that engage in “chain broadcasting.” As
defined in § 3 of the Communications Act of 1934, chain broadcasting is the
“simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations.”
Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 n.1 (1943). Examples of
network media today include NBC, ABC, and CBS.
65. At the end of 1938, there were 660 commercial stations in the United States, of
which 341 were affiliated exclusively with NBC. Id. at 197. Further, 102 stations were
affiliated with the Columbia Broadcasting Company (CBS). Id. While consolidation
brought wider services to more people, the Commission promulgating the Chain
Broadcasting Regulations worried about the effect of consolidation on licensee’s
“statutory duty of determining which programs would best serve the needs of their
community.” Id. at 199.
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local stations to affiliate with multiple networks,66 limiting network
ownership of stations,67 and enhancing the local affiliate’s ability to
reject network programming.68 If a large corporation wished to profit
from a smaller affiliate, FCC regulations ensured a degree of local
station autonomy to best serve local markets. The Supreme Court
upheld these regulations in NBC,69 agreeing that local programming was
66. See id. (discussing the FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting, Commission
Order No. 37, Docket No. 5060 (1941)). The Court stated that exclusive affiliation
clauses deny station licensees the freedom to choose programs best suited to their needs
and “in this matter the duty . . . to operate in the public interest is defeated.” Id.
67. See id. at 206-07 (examining the Report on Chain Broadcasting’s finding that
the “licensing of two stations in the same area to a single network organization is
basically unsound and contrary to the public interest”).
68. The Supreme Court in NBC backed the Report on Chain Broadcasting and
rejected the network practice of requiring local affiliates to object to network
programming three weeks prior to broadcast. From the “skeletal information” provided
to affiliates about such broadcasts, the station had no way of knowing whether the
programming fit the “public interest” or contained offensive material. See id. at 204-05.
Moreover, the local affiliate had the burden of proof showing a proposed replacement
program better suited the public interest. Id.
69. See generally Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 190. Defending the Regulations’
broad reach, the Court drew upon prior decisions to reiterate the FCC’s power to control
both the technical and substantive requirements of radio licensing. The NBC Court cited
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), and Federal Radio Commission v.
Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933), two earlier cases which emphasized and approved the
broad congressional delegation to promote the “public interest, convenience, or
necessity” by fighting “monopolistic domination of the broadcasting field.” Nat’l Broad.
Co., 319 U.S. at 216-19. Also, “[t]he avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934
was to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States. To
that end Congress endowed the Communications Commission with comprehensive
powers to promote and realize the vast potentialities of radio.” Id. at 217. Justice
Frankfurter then emphasized the dynamic and fluid nature of the broadcasting industry:
[Overly specific Congressional regulations] would have stereotyped the
powers of the [FCC] to specific details in regulating a field of enterprise the
dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfolding. And so
Congress did what experience had taught it in similar attempts at regulation,
even in fields where the subject matter of regulation was far less fluid and
dynamic than radio. The essence of that experience was to define broad areas
for regulation and to establish standards for judgment adequately related in
their application to the problems to be solved.
Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter also unhesitatingly affirmed the
broad authority delegated to the FCC to regulate in the “public interest”:
True enough, the Act does not explicitly say that the Commission shall have
power to deal with network practices found inimical to the public interest. But
Congress was acting in a field of regulation which was both new and dynamic.
“Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of
government control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic
domination in the broadcasting field.” In the context of the developing

673

ENDEMANN.DOC

11/20/2006 1:30 PM

a “vital part of community life.”70 Thus, the listening public’s interest
subordinated private profits, and heavy government regulation capped
the growth potential of private broadcasters.
Analyzing the now defunct “fairness doctrine” illustrates how early
public interest policies focused on the listening public’s, rather than the
broadcaster’s, interest in diversity. The fairness doctrine required that
radio and television licensees give adequate coverage to significant
public issues by ensuring fair coverage that accurately presented conflicting
views.71 For example, if the XYZ Network sold Person A ten minutes of
airtime in which Person A attacked Person B’s reputation, fairness
required XYZ provide Person B with ten minutes to respond.72 If Person
B was unavailable or unable to afford ten minutes, XYZ needed to air B’s
views at their own cost and initiative.73 Because a license carried a
corresponding “public trustee” responsibility, abiding by regulations like
the fairness doctrine significantly intruded upon broadcasters’ private
rights to profit and freely select services.
Under the old public trust model, ex parte seizure of a non-interfering
pirate broadcaster’s equipment may have been appropriate. The first
problems to which it was directed, the Act gave the Commission not niggardly
but expansive powers. . . . [A] comprehensive mandate to “encourage the larger
and more effective use of radio in the public interest,” . . . by making “special
regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting.”
Id. at 218-19 (citations omitted). Throughout the opinion, Justice Frankfurter referenced
and applied the evidentiary findings of the FCC’s Report on Chain Broadcasting without
reservation. See generally id. at 193-227.
Naturally, the Court’s role is to faithfully interpret the laws, not to critique the policies
thereof. See id. at 218 (“We would be asserting our personal views regarding the
effective utilization of radio were we to deny that the Commission was entitled to find
that the large public aims of the Communications Act of 1934 comprehend the
considerations which moved the Commission in promulgating the Chain Broadcasting
Regulations.”). Justice Frankfurter also withheld judgment on the Regulations’ affects
on furthering the public interest, commenting that if NBC thinks “that the regulations are
unwise, that they are not likely to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission
intended, we can say only that the appellants have selected the wrong forum for such a
plea.” Id. at 224. Citing Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942),
Justice Frankfurter wrote “[w]e certainly have neither technical competence nor legal
authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken by the Commission. Our
duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based upon
findings supported by evidence . . . .” Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 224.
Justice Frankfurter concluded his NBC analysis with a ringing endorsement of the
FCC: “If time and changing circumstances reveal that the ‘public interest’ is not served
by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in
accordance with its statutory obligations.” Id. at 225.
70. Id. at 203.
71. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 238-39.
72. See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-86 (1969)
(discussing the fairness doctrine’s origins and reaffirming the FCC’s authority to
regulate pursuant to the doctrine).
73. See id. at 383.
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fifty years of broadcasting were characterized by two things: (1) a heavy
regulatory footprint; and (2) listener-oriented regulations favoring
diversity and localism at the expense of private broadcaster profits.
Because developing the complex industry required heavy government
regulation, the public interest in the scheme’s integrity would outweigh
the private interest in unlicensed broadcasting. Policies like the fairness
doctrine already placed significant restrictions on broadcasters’ ability to
operate without government intrusion. Moreover, the public counted on
the regulatory scheme’s ability to deliver diverse and local programming.
Ex parte seizure of non-interfering pirate radio equipment would provide
appropriate punishment for broadcasters posing as “public trustees”
without official administrative approval. Because licenses carried significant
responsibilities to advance listener interests, transmitting in defiance of
articulated public interest standards would constitute a public harm
punishable by the agency. As the next section illustrates, the FCC policy
shift towards a marketplace theory significantly removes the government’s
presence in the broadcasting industry. Ex parte seizure of non-interfering
pirate radio equipment may not be justified in a regulatory environment
now premised on private interests.
D. Deregulation: The Government Takes a Less Active Role
In marked contrast to prior policy, current FCC regulation has shifted
from a public trust model to a privately driven approach. Starting in the
early 1980s, deregulation ceded greater power to private interests by
relaxing radio ownership restrictions.74 Congress approved the most

74. In 1984, the national ownership cap was raised to twelve AM stations
and twelve FM stations nationally. See Prindle, supra note 24, at 295. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed local ownership rules and eliminated the
national ownership cap altogether. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, § 202(a), 110 Stat. 56, 110-11. The FCC assumed that the public interest in
diversity would benefit through the efficiencies gained in consolidation.
[P]olicies that may have been necessary in the early days of radio may not be
necessary in an environment where thousands of licensees offer diverse sorts
of programming and appeal to all manner of segmented audiences. . . .
....
We believe that given conditions in the radio industry, it is time to heed that
sentiment and to reduce the regulatory role played by Commission policies and
rules, and to permit the discipline of the marketplace to play a more prominent
role. It is our conclusion that the regulations that we are retaining and the
functioning of the marketplace will result in service in the public interest that
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significant deregulation through the Telecommunications Act of 1996,75
and the FCC further relaxed ownership restrictions in 2003.76 Besides
is more adaptable to changes in consumer preferences and at less financial cost
and with less regulatory burden.
In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 969, 1014 (1981).
75. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).
76. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). The FCC justified its 2003 deregulation order on decreased
scarcity, or increased amounts of diverse information available to the consumer. See id.
at 46,291. Critics argue the rationale is problematic because the FCC assumes greater
modes of media communication adequately substitute for those squeezed out of existing
mediums:
The FCC’s assumption that non-broadcast media can serve as equal substitutes
for traditional broadcast channels faces significant difficulty. Broadcasters
occupy a unique place in our culture. Broadcast content is pervasive, popular,
responsive and valuable. For these reasons, non-broadcast [for example,
Internet] media are unlikely to fulfill the same needs for the viewing public.
Aaron Perzanowski, Note, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC: The Persistence of
Scarcity, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 743, 760 (2005).
Although consumers use new mediums like Internet, cable, and satellite services,
scarcity still persists in the broadcast spectrum. Perzanowski argues scarcity persists
because broadcast media remains an attractive and cheap source of entertainment and
information. Id. at 760-61. For example, nearly every home and car in America has a
radio, and the value of broadcast stations remains very high. “If Internet sites, for
example, served as equal substitutes for broadcast stations, we should expect to see
station owners abandoning their expensive broadcast enterprises and adopting a low cost
Internet-only media strategy.” Id.
Accepting the FCC’s “decreased scarcity” rationale also raises different questions
concerning the First Amendment and intrusiveness of FCC enforcement. One critic
argues that, “where scarcity is not present, the government’s regulatory authority
correspondingly decreases.” Enrique Armijo, Public Airwaves, Private Mergers: Analyzing
the FCC’s Faulty Justifications for the 2003 Media Ownership Rule Changes, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 1482, 1490 (2004). Specifically, the FCC statute authorizing swift and intrusive ex
parte civil forfeiture necessarily infers a high degree of scarcity. 47 U.S.C. § 510(b)
(2000). For example, a pirate broadcaster interfering with a licensed radio station or air
traffic controller illustrates radio’s inherent limits and justifies a rapid remedy. One
cannot argue this type of pirate broadcasting deserves First Amendment protection when
public safety or the licensed rights of others are at risk.
If one accepts the FCC’s premise that decreased scarcity permits decreased
government involvement, a pirate radio operator posing no interference threat deserves
different First Amendment analysis. Comparing Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974) with Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) illustrates
this point. In 1974, the Tornillo Court struck down a variation of Red Lion’s “fairness
doctrine” as applied to print media. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. Although the Court did
not reference Red Lion or scarcity, Tornillo provided more First Amendment protection
from government regulation to newspaper publishers than broadcasters. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 44, at 1130-31. Though not explicit in the Court’s reasoning, it may be that
broadcast media’s comparatively greater scarcity warrants greater government intrusion
than print media. But see id. (raising this contention and arguing that there are, in fact,
more broadcasters than newspapers). Therefore, if the FCC finds less scarcity in
broadcast media, reduced governmental intrusion in broadcast media should follow.
This should apply across the board, from the front end of license application to the back
end of licensing enforcement.
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eliminating ownership restrictions, the FCC also rejected many contentbased policies like the fairness doctrine.77 Although the government
maintained ownership over the broadcast spectrum, private parties could
now broadcast with greater freedom from government intervention. The
current licensing scheme also reflects free market motives: the FCC now
auctions licenses to the highest bidder instead of awarding free licenses
based on “public interest” considerations.78
Throughout the deregulation process, critics railed against deregulation’s
effects on the radio industry. Because deregulation is premised on
sufficient competition within a marketplace, abrupt deregulation could
result in large-scale consolidation and anti-competitive behavior which
would harm traditional public interest goals like localism and diversity.79
Although the radio industry has in fact experienced massive
consolidation,80 measurable gains in certain qualities of service have
been recorded.81
FCC deregulation and the 1996/2003 legislation represented significant
government withdrawals from many areas of the broadcast industry.

77. The FCC repealed the doctrine administratively, finding that the fairness
doctrine chilled speech by acting as a “tax” on airing controversial issues. In re
Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R.
5043 (1987). The D.C. Circuit found the repeal of the fairness doctrine was supported
by the “public interest” mandate. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 666-69
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
78. See Federal Communications Commission, supra note 33.
79. See Prindle, supra note 24, at 298; Howard, supra note 58, at 278 (“It is a
presumptive leap of logic . . . to conclude that increased competition warrants complete
abandonment of national ownership caps which have existed for over half a century.”).
80. As predicted, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 resulted in large scale radio
consolidation. While the number of radio stations increased by 5.4%, the number of
owners decreased by 33.6%. George Williams & Scott Roberts, Radio Industry Review
2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and Finance, FCC (Sept., 2002), http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A20.doc (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
Before the Act’s passage, the two largest radio stations owned 115 stations. Today, they
own over 1400. William Safire, On Media Giantism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A19.
In most metropolitan markets, the two largest firms average 74% of the market’s
advertising revenue. Williams & Roberts, supra.
81. For example, larger companies now have more resources to extend to their
news departments. Steve Knoll, Radio Station Consolidation: Good News for Owners,
But What About Listeners?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at D5. Theoretically, better
news services better inform the listening public and further democracy. See Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (“[A]n
informed public is the essence of working democracy”). The Broadcast Ownership
Rules also cite studies showing that consolidated stations better share resources and earn
higher ratings. 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286; 46,313 (Aug. 5, 2003).
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The deregulation, premised on marketplace theory, assumed that profitminded competition would best fulfill the “public interest principles of
competition, diversity, and localism.”82 The efficiencies gained by
eliminating ownership caps were intended to allow network broadcasters
to offer higher quality services to greater numbers of people.83
Marketplace theory tweaks the traditional meaning of competition in
the public interest definition. Although the old public interest regulations
promoted competition within the radio industry,84 deregulation’s stated
goal was to make the radio industry more competitive with new information
mediums.85 For example, it was thought less regulated formats like Internet
and satellite had been drawing audiences away from radio.86 Instead of
losing listeners with government structured programming, a privately driven
market could better respond to audience tastes. Greater profits could make
radio more attractive, and broadcasters could draw customers away from
computer screens and satellite dishes.
Although the radio industry has become more competitive, traditional
public interest goals like localism and diversity have suffered.87 Massive
radio consolidation with few or no new entrants into the industry implies
that listeners receive information from fewer sources. These fewer
sources are larger, national networks buying up competing broadcasters
and replacing local services with economies of scale.88 The resulting
decreases in localism and diversity stand at odds with early FCC public
interest policy as well as Supreme Court policy developed in support of
early FCC regulation.89 Most non-interfering pirate broadcasters fulfill
82. See Prindle, supra note 24, at 297.
83. See, e.g., id. at 297-98.
84. For instance, the NBC Chain Broadcasting Regulations ensured that local and
diverse voices serving radio’s public interest would remain competitive with media
conglomerates entering the broadcast industry. See supra text accompanying notes 7494.
85. Previous regulations prevented broadcasters from keeping economic pace with
non-broadcast competitors. While non-broadcast services like cable and satellite
companies can earn revenue from advertising and subscriber fees, broadcasters depend
solely on advertising. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286; 46,292 (Aug. 5,
2003).
86. See, e.g., id. at 46293-94.
87. See Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1163-72; Prindle, supra note 24, at 302-19.
88. Unfettered by ownership caps, corporate media consolidation strove to cut
costs and maximize subsidiary station profits. For example, eliminating local news and
public affairs in favor of syndicated, mass produced services boosts profit margins while
robbing communities of specific, localized broadcasts. See Howard, supra note 58, at
279-80 (citing Mark Gimein, Groups Look to Cut Costs, Set the Pace, MEDIAWEEK, Sept.
9, 1996, at MQ28.).
A group station owner testifying before Congress admitted as much: “It’s commodity
trading to us. We don’t know [our] community. We’re short-term players.” 142 CONG.
REC. S6108 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (alteration in original).
89. See infra Part III.
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the traditional public interest in localism and diversity.90 Ex parte
seizure permanently deprives listeners of these benefits.
For an organization tasked with protecting radio diversity, a theory
premised on removing barriers to maximize growth may not provide
necessary safeguards to ensure variety.91 Although tight control of the
airwaves developed radio into a diverse source of information and
entertainment, deregulation has consolidated media ownership and
decreased diversity. While the FCC’s approach to radio regulation has
completely reversed course,92 localism and diversity remain core goals.93
90. Id. The homogenization of music radio typifies the lack of diversity wrought
by deregulation. As it becomes more difficult and expensive to introduce new product
on the radio, the long-standing practice of payola has drawn more attention. See Press
Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Sony Settles Payola
Investigation (July 25, 2005), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/jul/jul25a_05.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006). For the music industry, deregulation is a vicious circle: as
larger companies consolidate the airwaves, it becomes more expensive for diverse, nonmainstream artists to get exposure, and only larger recording studios can afford to secure
airtime. Gradually, radio becomes a mouthpiece and profit generator among fewer and
larger organizations. The incentive for diversity has been replaced by an incentive to
play guaranteed profit generators. Judging by the growing popularity of niche satellite,
Internet radio and podcasting, the public interest in new and diverse programming
remains strong. For example, XM Satellite Radio provides over 150 commercial free
radio formats. See XM Satellite Radio, Corporate Information, http://www.xmradio.
com/corporate_info/corporate_information_main.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
Internet radio providers, like Yahoo!’s “Launchcast,” provide similar services which also
let users customize radio stations to play their favorite artists. The Internet service will
also suggest new artists in the same genre as the user’s preferred artists. Launchcast,
http://www.launchcast. com (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). One can extrapolate this point
beyond radio as an entertainment medium. An FCC report found that radio advertising
rates have jumped over 90% since the 1996 deregulation. See Williams & Roberts,
supra note 80. Not only can fewer large corporations afford to advertise their products,
the rates have profound implications for grassroots public service organizations and local
political figures who use radio to gather support. Current FCC deregulation fails this
core diversity function, and stations fulfilling a diversity interest should not be priced out
of the spectrum.
91. Indeed, such trust that large corporations will best serve the public interest
seems increasingly dubious in light of the following quote from Clear Channel
Communications CEO Lowry Mays: “If anyone said we were in the radio business, it
wouldn’t be someone from our company. We’re not in the business of providing news
and information. We’re not in the business of providing well-researched music. We’re
simply in the business of selling our customers products.” Alexander Lynch, US: The
Media Lobby, CORPWATCH, Mar. 11, 2005, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11947
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
92. FCC Chairman Michael Powell observed during the 2003 deregulation that
“the market is my religion.” William Safire, On Media Giantism, supra note 80, at A19.
93. William Kennard stressed the FCC’s continuing commitments to localism and
diversity when introducing the new LPFM regulations. See Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1168.
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Emphasizing “public interest” through profit-driven private choice, current
FCC rhetoric is also different from the original legislative intent.94
Absent a showing of interference, enforcing licensing requirements
with ex parte seizure conflicts with a regulatory scheme premised on
privately driven marketplace theory. Under the old public trust model,
ex parte seizure may have been appropriate to preserve the regulatory
scheme, further public confidence in radio development, and dissuade
amateur pirates from stumbling on adjacent frequencies. Because FCC
authority required broadcasters to meet goals and serve the listening
public, operating in defiance of these responsibilities constituted a public
harm in itself.95 However, since the shift to marketplace theory, private
interests have replaced government regulation in areas like licensing and
programming.96 In other words, private competition better serves listener
94. As a sponsor of the bill enacted as the Radio Act of 1927, Congressman
White’s comments reflect a communal approach to regulation:
We have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all our people to
enjoy this means of communication can be preserved only by the repudiation
of the idea underlying the 1912 law that anyone who will may transmit and by
the assertion in its stead of the doctrine that the right of the public to service is
superior to the right of any individual . . . . The recent radio conference met
this issue squarely. It recognized that in the present state of scientific
development there must be a limitation upon the number of broadcasting
stations and it recommended that licenses should be issued only to those
stations whose operation would render a benefit to the public, are necessary in
the public interest, or would contribute to the development of the art. This
principle was approved by every witness before your committee. We have
written it into the bill. If enacted into law, the broadcasting privilege will not
be a right of selfishness. It will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be
served.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 n.5 (1969) (citing 67 CONG. REC. 5479).
According to the District of Columbia Circuit in KFKB Broadcasting Ass’n v. Federal
Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931):
In its Second Annual Report (1928), p. 169, the commission cautioned
broadcasters “who consume much of the valuable time allotted to them under
their licenses in matters of a distinctly private nature which are not only
uninteresting, but also distasteful to the listening public.” When Congress
provided that the question whether a license should be issued or renewed
should be dependent upon a finding of public interest, convenience, or
necessity, it very evidently had in mind that broadcasting should not be a mere
adjunct of a particular business but should be of a public character. Obviously,
there is no room in the broadcast band for every business or school of thought.
95. See KFKB Broad. Ass’n, 47 F.2d at 672 (implying a paramount public right to
a well-regulated spectrum).
96. For example, private competition drives the FCC’s auctioning scheme. See
supra note 79. The fairness doctrine has also been abandoned, meaning that private
broadcasters no longer face a strict government-ordered programming requirement. See
supra note 45. At the high water mark in 1960, an FCC Program Policy Statement
identified fourteen major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest. Martin,
supra note 27, at 1177 (citing FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, NETWORK
PROGRAMMING INQUIRY: REPORT & STATEMENT OF POLICY, 25 FED. REG. 7291, 7295
(1960). Licenses would not be awarded unless an applicant’s programming reflected the
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interests than does a public trust regulatory scheme. There is no reason
license enforcement should not follow suit. Without interference, there
is no private harm. Everyone who wishes to be heard is heard. Indeed,
using ex parte seizure to silence pirates cuts against the FCC’s traditional
competition component defining public interest. Theoretically, noninterfering pirate broadcasters should compete for market share and push
other broadcasters to refine their services, thus advancing the industry as
a whole.
Parties seeking ex parte enforcement in other privately regulated
industries must meet a considerably higher bar. For example, a trademark
owner wanting to seize counterfeit goods needs to establish irreparable
harm and a likelihood of success on the merits.97 In the absence of
interference, the FCC would have a tough time meeting the “irreparable
harm” prong. Before courts authorize ex parte seizure, requiring interference
would demonstrate a private “harm” necessitating a powerful administrative
remedy.
III. NEW REGULATORY PHILOSOPHIES REQUIRE
NEW SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
A. The FCC and LPFM: On Again, Off Again
Lacking funds needed to acquire expensive licenses and high power
equipment, non-interfering pirate radio operators usually operate “Low
Power FM” (LPFM) stations. Typically, this means operating at less
than 100 watts, or within a ten to twelve mile radius.98 Practicality and
ideology work in tandem: the low cost of operation and communityfocused message provide economical, diverse alternatives to big market
media.99 LPFM affordability furthers diversity by allowing more people
to access the broadcast spectrum. Due to LPFM’s limited range, more
broadcasters can operate locally without interference.
“tastes, needs, and desires of the community.” Id. at 1178 (citing Krasnow & Goodman
supra note 41, at 616).
97. Lucas G. Paglia & Mark A. Rush, End Game: The Ex Parte Seizure Process
and the Battle Against Bootleggers, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 5, 8 (2002).
98. Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1133. One wholesale exception to FCC licensing
requirements applies to stations operating with a field strength not exceeding 250
microvolts per meter at three meters. 47 C.F.R. § 15.239(b) (2005). This limits
unlicensed radio broadcasts to a two-block radius, too weak for effective community
broadcasting service. United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1005 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).
99. See Dorothy Kidd, Micro-Powered Radio, WHOLE EARTH, Spring 2000, at 87.
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Early FCC regulations permitting LPFM shared policies similar to
those accompanying regulations restricting network ownership: listeners
were best served by a variety of diverse, local voices.100 The FCC made
LPFM attractive to amateur operators by waiving certain laborious
reporting and identification requirements. In 1978, however, the FCC
revoked the ability to apply for a low power radio license.101 In a policy
shift presaging marketplace theory, the FCC determined that high power
FM stations could use the radio channels more efficiently by “serv[ing]
larger areas, and bring[ing] effective noncommercial educational radio
service to many who . . . lack[ed] it.”102 Operating a radio station under
100 watts became illegal overnight, regardless of whether the station
posed an interference threat. While the FCC suggested that low power
radio stations (expensively)103 increase wattage to obtain a commercial
license, many low power radio operators kept broadcasting in defiance
of FCC regulations.104 Aside from a few grandfathered exceptions, this
class of previously licensed broadcasters became pirate radio operators
overnight. From an interference and safety perspective, nothing about
LPFM broadcasts had changed except formal FCC approval.
Despite the FCC’s considerable enforcement efforts,105 the number of
illegal LPFM operators increased106 in relation to media consolidation.107
In the years following the 1996 regulatory changes, the FCC shut down,
on average, more than a dozen pirate radio operators each month.108
Despite the risks, pirate radio operators continued broadcasting in
response to deregulation’s effects on localism and diversity.109 The fact
that LPFM stations’ eclectic formats drew enthusiastic local audiences
vindicated the traditional public interest diversity function.
100. See generally Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
101. See In re Changes in the Rules Relating to Noncommercial Educ. FM Broad.
Stations, 69 F.C.C.2d 240, 244-51 (1978).
102. Id. at 248.
103. Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1168 (“Launching a high powered radio station costs
at least $100,000 in FCC licensing fees and engineering studies.”).
104. Ruggiero, 317 F.3d at 241.
105. See id. The FCC has four options when dealing with an unlicensed
broadcaster: (1) seek an injunction to stop the unlicensed broadcasting, 47 U.S.C. §
401(b) (2000); (2) issue a cease and desist order, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (2000); (3) impose a
monetary forfeiture, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000); or (4) institute an in rem forfeiture, 47
U.S.C. § 510 (2000).
106. Ruggiero, 317 F.3d at 241-42.
107. See Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14.
108. Ruggiero, 317 F.3d at 242 (citing FCC’s Low Power FM: A Review of the
FCC’s Spectrum Management Responsibilities: Hearing on H.R. 3439 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Commerce, 106th Cong. 85 (2000)).
109. Paul Riismandel, Radio with a Conscience: Community Radio in the Late ‘90s
(1999), http://www.mediageek.org/rfc/Revue1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
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The FCC finally acknowledged deregulation’s adverse effects on
localism and diversity by recognizing that LPFM broadcasters operated
to fill a void. In 1999, after inviting public comment,110 two new classes
of LPFM stations were proposed.111 Reconfirming LPFM’s value, the
FCC proposal emphasized public interest goals112 and admitted deregulation’s
failure to properly support community broadcasting.113 Offering current
pirates amnesty, the pirate operator needed to certify that they stopped
broadcasting within twenty-four hours of being told to do so by the FCC
and no later than a deadline listed in the proposed rules.114 This proposal
provided a chance for pirate radio operators to legally preserve their
commitments to localism and diversity.
Fearing legitimized competition, the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB) lobbied heavily against the FCC findings and
proposed rules.115 Congress quickly superseded the FCC by enacting the
Radio Broadcast Preservation Act of 2000 (RBPA).116 Essentially, this
closed the door on current and former pirate radio broadcasters by
“prohibiting any applicant from obtaining a low-power FM license if the
applicant has engaged in any manner in the unlicensed operation of any
station in violation of § 301117 of the Communications Act of 1934.”118
110. In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 14 F.C.C.R. 2471, ¶ 65 (1999).
111. In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, ¶ 11 (2000).
112. Id. at 2210-13.
113. Martin, supra note 27, at 1192 (citing Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv.,
15 F.C.C.R. at 2213.
114. Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. at ¶¶ 53-54.
115. Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14. The NAB is the main lobby group of
free, over-the-air radio and television broadcasters. The National Association of
Broadcasters, About NAB, http://www.nab.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2000 alone, the parent
companies of the big five television and cable broadcasters (ABC, CBS, NBC,
CNN and Fox) spent close to $27 million on lobbying firms. And that excludes
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) which spent $5.7 million the
same year. According to the Center for Public Integrity, from 1998 until 2003,
when the Federal Communications Commission considered another round of
“relaxing” ownership regulations, “the lobbying expenditures by the broadcast
industry ha[d] risen 74 percent.”
Alexander Lynch, US: The Media Lobby, supra note 91. For additional examples, Clear
Channel spent only $12,000 on lobbying in 2001. By the time of the 2003 rule change,
this had risen over 19,000% to $2.28 million. Id.
116. Radio Broadcast Preservation Act of 2000 (RBPA), Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114
Stat. 2762, § 632.
117. Section 301 provides for the ownership of radio channels by the United States
government and requires a license for anyone wishing to transmit over the channels. 47
U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
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That is, all low-power pirates were barred from obtaining a new LPFM
license regardless of whether or when they had ceased to operate
unlawfully.119 Responding to Congress, the FCC duly modified the
proposed rules to include the stringent requirements,120 and the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals has since upheld the limitation against
attack.121
B. Non-Interfering LPFM Continues to Fulfill
Supreme Court “Public Interest” Policy
While FCC policy shifted from public trust to marketplace theory, the
Supreme Court steadfastly advocated a “marketplace of ideas” approach
to spectrum regulation.122 This marketplace of ideas doctrine embraced
wide varieties of competing voices to further the listener’s First
Amendment interests.123 Competing voices furthered democracy, where
“truth [would] ultimately prevail.”124 Like early FCC regulations, the
Court also valued local broadcasters’ positive effects on the community.125
118. Radio Broadcast Preservation Act of 2000, § 632(a)(1)(B).
119. Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
120. Id.; In re Creation of Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, 2230 (2000),
as amended by 16 F.C.C.R. 8026, ¶¶ 10-11 (2001). The adopted regulations place heavy
burdens on non-pirate operators, too. “[B]y requiring a separation of three channels
between new LPFC stations and existing broadcasters, Congress and the FCC prevented
the creation of LPFM stations in most major markets, where the station’s small
broadcasting range could reach the largest audiences.” Perzanowski, supra note 76, at
762.
121. See, e.g., Ruggiero, 317 F.3d 239.
122. In 1969, the Supreme Court in Red Lion best summarized this approach:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with ends and
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it by the Government itself or a private licensee. . . . It is the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not
constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 390.
124. See id.
125. Throughout his NBC opinion, Justice Frankfurter carefully credited the Report
on Chain Broadcasting rather than proposed any overt policy guidelines himself.
However, he cited an earlier Supreme Court case stressing the public’s interest in local
broadcasting: “An important element of public interest and convenience affecting the
issue of a license is the ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service to the
community reached by his broadcasts.” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
216 (1943) (citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)). This
suggests that, at the time, the Supreme Court and FCC shared a commitment to localism
best served by ownership regulation.
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Because public trust regulations actively promoted variety,126 early FCC
policy promoted the Court’s normative First Amendment view.
Although rooted in similar philosophies, the FCC’s current marketplace
theory conflicts with the Court’s marketplace of ideas. Regulations
emphasizing the public’s listening interests have been replaced with free
market philosophies emphasizing the broadcasters’ profit potential. In
doing so, the First Amendment analysis has shifted from listener to
broadcaster.127 As mentioned above, deregulation has resulted in media
consolidation. The marketplace of ideas has shrunk as listeners receive
information from fewer sources. While indicating less trust in the FCC’s
“public interest” role,128 the Court still relies on the marketplace of ideas
to promote freedom of expression.129 Current FCC doctrine, which
constricts the marketplace, may inhibit the Court’s traditional First
Amendment view of broadcast regulation.130
NBC still stands as the Court’s definitive holding on licensing and the
First Amendment. In NBC, the Court trusted the FCC to regulate
broadcasting by emphasizing diversity over monopoly.131 Placing
paramount importance in the public’s First Amendment “marketplace,”
the NBC Court separated the broadcaster’s freedom of speech from the
medium used for transmission. To wit, the networks’ First Amendment
arguments failed because “[t]he right of free speech does not include . . .
the right to use the facilities of radio without a license.”132

126. See supra notes 71-73.
127. The NBC Court upheld regulations from a broadcaster’s First Amendment
attack premised on an argument that the listener’s First Amendment interests would
suffer. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 225-27. Unlike NBC, courts increasingly require
greater FCC justifications for actions appearing to infringe on broadcaster’s First
Amendment rights. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1047
(D.C. Cir. 2002). The Fox Television court called an FCC decision “arbitrary and
capricious and contrary to law” because the FCC failed to give adequate reasons for its
regulatory decisions. Id.
128. Id.
129. Recent Court majorities reference the “marketplace of ideas.” See, e.g., Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). Although the Reno case deals with content-based
Internet censuring, id. at 871-72, the core doctrine is consistent with Red Lion. That is,
the public’s First Amendment interest in the freedom of expression is furthered by an
uninhibited exchange of ideas from a wide variety of viewpoints. See id. at 884-85.
130. See Benjamin, supra note 41, at 54-65 (discussing current confusion over
which level of scrutiny to apply to broadcast regulations).
131. See supra note 69.
132. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 190, 227.
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Although NBC precludes First Amendment challenges to ex parte seizure,
the Court may want to reconsider NBC in light of recent developments.
First, the Court reached the NBC decision under the old public trust
model of FCC regulation. While the Court’s First Amendment policy
has remained constant, the regulatory policy has reversed. Since
marketplace theory focused on private interests, radio’s marketplace of
ideas has shrunk. Non-interfering pirate radio furthers Court policy by
adding diverse and local voices back to the marketplace of ideas. NBC
should not deny First Amendment protection in an inapposite regulatory
environment.
Second, Congress’s refusal to follow FCC LPFM recommendations
stands at odds with NBC’s “expert agency” deference.133 In countering
concerns over freedom of speech abridgments, the NBC Court placed
much trust in the FCC’s expert ability to regulate in the public interest.134
The recent history surrounding the LPFM proposals indicated less faith
from Congress. Despite technical findings dismissing LPFM interference
effects,135 Congress refused to accept regulations recognizing LPFM’s
benefits.136 The FCC was then placed in the awkward position of enforcing
technical policy contrary to published agency reports.137 Alternatively,
the legislative action might reflect anti-competitive, marketplace-shrinking
lobbying efforts of large private broadcasters. Under either theory, the
FCC may no longer be as uniquely competent or independent to regulate
in the public interest. Because broadcasters use the spectrum primarily
for sending and receiving information, the Court may want to take a
more active role protecting the free exchange of ideas. Refining NBC
would remove the FCC as sole First Amendment “gatekeeper” to the
airwaves. For example, requiring a showing of interference before denying
Constitutional protection would help ensure that diverse broadcasters are
not arbitrarily or invidiously kept from competing for listeners.

133. See id. at 215-20 (giving the FCC wide authority to promulgate regulations
ordering the “fluid and dynamic” industry of radio).
134. See supra note 69.
135. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Lottery Today
Determines Order for Accepting Applications for Low Power FM Radio Station
Licenses (Mar. 27, 2000), 2000 WL 306359.
136. See id.; cf. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Chairman
Urges Broadcasters to Shift Focus from Fighting Against Low Power Radio to Fighting
for Digital Opportunities (Apr. 11, 2000), 2000 WL 369665 (addressing the likely source
of congressional opposition to LPFM).
137. See, e.g., In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. 2205 (2000)
(publishing findings and proposing rules ultimately overruled by Congress’s passage of
the RBPA); In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 14 F.C.C.R. 2471 (1999).
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Some critics argue that keeping spectrum idle violates the First
Amendment.138 If one accepts this, non-interfering pirate broadcasters
already have presumptive First Amendment rights. Although the argument
blurs the line between speech and the spectrum,139 these critics insist that
the scarcity rationale only warrants broadcast restrictions that limit
interference.140 Today, much commentary centers around the scarcity
rationale’s continued viability141 and level of “scrutiny”142 FCC
regulations should receive. Should courts refine NBC or acknowledge a
First Amendment interest, ex parte seizure to silence non-interfering
pirate broadcasters would probably not pass Constitutional muster. The
next section turns to this analysis.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND REASONABLE
ALTERNATIVES TO EX PARTE SEIZURE
A. The Denial of Fort Wayne Protection
The Fourth Amendment protects all citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures.143 In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana144 the
Supreme Court recognized that ex parte seizures affecting First Amendment
rights require greater scrutiny.145 Specifically, mere probable cause to
believe that a law has been broken is not enough to remove certain
speech from the public domain.146 By denying a First Amendment right,
138. See generally Benjamin, supra note 41 (arguing that FCC regulation should be
limited to concerns about interference and stating that the scarcity rationale undercuts
government restrictions on spectrum).
139. Id. at 32.
140. Id. at 65-77. Of course, “independent” First Amendment rationales can always
limit broadcasting; for example, the Court has upheld regulations on licensed
broadcasters that restrict obscenity and indecency. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
141. See generally Benjamin, supra note 41.
142. Id.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
144. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
145. See id. at 63 (holding that “while the general rule under the Fourth Amendment
is that any and all contraband . . . may be seized on probable cause (and even without a
warrant in various circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presumptively
protected by the First Amendment are involved.”); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,
468 (1985) (“The First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for and
seizures of presumptively protected material and requires that the Fourth Amendment be
applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude’ in such circumstances.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
146. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 62-67.
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NBC denies pirate operators heightened Fort Wayne protection against
government intrusion.
Developed over obscenity seizures, the principles supporting the Fort
Wayne doctrine are not broad enough to cover pirate radio seizures.
Fort Wayne emphasized concerns about the subjective nature of
obscenity determinations and prior restraint.147 In other words, the fear
of ex parte seizure chills the dissemination of protected speech. Courts
have held the doctrine inapplicable to objective measures of unlicensed
radio transmission.148 Instead, courts relied on the regulatory backdrop
denying licenses.149 They rightly held that determining obscenity carries
a higher risk of subjective bias than measuring radio transmissions
violating an objective regulatory threshold.
Nonetheless, given recent lobbying concerns and the decrease in
localism and diversity, courts may want to extend a Fort Wayne-like
doctrine to non-interfering pirate broadcasters. To do so, one must argue
that the public’s interest for diversity and localism is akin to the private
interest against prior restraint. Given the Court’s views that both interests
promote the freedom of expression and further liberty, a legitimate
argument may exist on an abstract level.150 Once protected, ex parte
seizures may not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”
standard. At any rate, alternate enforcement methods better fit the
FCC’s current regulatory philosophy. Therefore, choosing ex parte
seizure over other enforcement methods requires greater scrutiny to
ensure reasonableness.
B. Alternative Enforcement Choices and Obstacles
Posed by Each One
Given alternative methods of enforcement, ex parte seizures of noninterfering broadcasting equipment may not be considered reasonable.
Unlike an operator interfering with licensed transmissions, a noninterfering broadcaster poses no immediate threat to the safety or
interests of others. The only people affected by the broadcast are voluntary
listeners. Without any immediate harm, the FCC could utilize three

147. Macon, 472 U.S. at 470.
148. U.S. v. Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 421-22 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
149. See United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(giving the FCC wide latitude in determining the constitutionality of their own licensing
scheme).
150. For the public’s interest in localism and diversity furthering democracy, see
supra Part III.B. For holdings that discuss prior restraint’s negative affects on liberty,
see Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (collecting cases).

688

ENDEMANN.DOC

[VOL. 43: 661, 2006]

11/20/2006 1:30 PM

Keelhauling Pirates
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

additional safeguards. Although less intrusive, none of the alternatives
completely mitigate deregulation’s effects on diversity and localism.
The first and least intrusive method is a “cease and desist” order.151
Although the FCC generally provides warning of possible ex parte
seizures,152 this notice does not follow the procedures for issuing a cease
and desist order.153 Challenging cease and desist orders, however,
involves practical difficulties: regardless of where pirate operators
broadcast, cease and desist orders can only be appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.154
An injunction against station operation provides another less
intrusive enforcement option.155 In fact, the FCC occasionally seeks
an injunction against pirate radio operators rather than an ex parte
seizure.156 At the very least, an injunctive hearing brings both parties
before a district court to argue the merits of the injunction. However,
obstacles like the “primary jurisdiction doctrine” await pirate operators
challenging the FCC’s basis for injunctive relief. Specifically, the
primary jurisdiction doctrine prevents pirate operators from raising
First Amendment arguments in district courts157 until they exhaust
administrative remedies.158
151. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (2000) reads, in pertinent part: “Where any person (1) has
failed to operate substantially as set forth in a license, (2) has violated or failed to
observe any of the provisions of this chapter [that is, a provision requiring license to
operate] . . . or (3) has violated or failed to observe any rule or regulation . . . the
Commission may order such person to cease and desist from such action.”
152. See, e.g., United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 218
F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000); Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14.
153. The cease and desist statute, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000), must follow 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(e) (2000). Section 312(e) references U.S.C. § 558(c) (2000) (addressing license
revocation) and extends its safeguards and opportunities to be heard to those receiving
cease and desist orders. The FCC notice, on the other hand, simply warns against
unlicensed broadcasting and informs the recipient about possible fines and seizure.
Importantly, the FCC notice provides a ten-day window for challenging the
determination while a true cease and desist order must provide thirty days under 47
U.S.C. § 312(c) (2000) before the issuance of such an order.
154. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(7) (2000).
155. 47 U.S.C. § 401(b) (2000).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Neset, 235 F.3d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
an order granting an FCC request for injunctive relief); United States v. Dunifer, 219
F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming a District Court injunction against a radio
operator and denying that the District Court had authority to hear the operator’s
affirmative defenses); Prayze FM v. FCC, 214 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming a
District Court injunction against a radio operator).
157. Dunifer, 219 F.3d at 1006. But see United States v. Any & All Radio Station
Transmission Equip., 204 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Maquina Musical]. The
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While constantly evolving FCC policy affects the marketplace of
ideas, the primary jurisdiction doctrine insulates the scheme from regular
First Amendment challenges. For example, when the FCC pursues
injunctive relief against a pirate broadcaster, they pick the time and place
to bring an action. Defendant operators will usually not deny their
unlicensed broadcasts; rather, they argue against the regulatory abridgment
of First Amendment rights.159 Shielded from constitutional arguments,
the district court generally grants the injunction and silences the pirate
broadcaster. As employed, the primary jurisdiction doctrine discriminates
against smaller broadcasters. When courts do analyze First Amendment
arguments, they are presented from large private companies able to
afford exhausting the administrative process. Thus, the primary jurisdiction
argument may chill regulatory challenges from local and diverse points
of view.
Levying forfeiture fines against unlicensed broadcasters may be the
best enforcement option for today’s regulatory environment.160 Given
marketplace theory and license auctioning, fining unlicensed broadcasters
may maximize revenue from the broadcast spectrum.
Forfeiture fines may also indirectly refine Supreme Court broadcast
jurisprudence. Like most FCC enforcement appeals, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia retains sole jurisdiction for broadcasters to
contest levied fines.161 However, some courts do not employ the primary
jurisdiction doctrine162 when the FCC uses local district courts to enforce
fines.163 In other words, operators defending against a court-ordered fine
may have standing to raise constitutional arguments. If the primary
jurisdiction doctrine does not apply, actions enforcing forfeiture fines
would probably prompt regular First Amendment challenges from pirate
operators. Diverse, local broadcasters contesting fines would have more
Macquina Musical case presumes proper district court jurisdiction over constitutional
arguments. However, courts now generally agree that constitutional defenses are
precluded at the district court level on the basis of standing. For an excellent discussion
of the evolving primary jurisdiction argument in injunction and in rem forfeiture cases,
see Prayze FM, 214 F.3d at 250-51, and Neset, 235 F.3d at 418-20.
158. Like cease and desist orders, exhausting administrative remedies is burdensome
because it involves appealing license denials in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2000).
159. See, e.g., Dunifer, 219 F.3d at 1005 (arguing that denial of low power FM
licenses abridged freedom of speech).
160. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000). For most unlicensed broadcasters who have not
applied for licenses, the fine accumulates at $10,000 per day with a cap at $75,000. 47
U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C) (2000).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(A) incorporates 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000).
162. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
163. The FCC can enforce forfeitures through local district courts, which highlights
discrepancies between FCC and pirate broadcaster ability to utilize local judicial
resources. 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2000).
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opportunities to make inroads against the NBC ruling. However,
because pirate broadcasters are modest in nature and because doing so
might risk repeatedly defending on constitutional grounds, the FCC
rarely uses monetary forfeiture as an enforcement tool.164
C. Ex Parte Seizure: Using the Most Intrusive Enforcement Method for
Non-Interfering Pirate Radio Is Unreasonable and Overbroad
Although each enforcement mechanism places unique burdens on
non-interfering pirate broadcasters, the alternatives are probably more
reasonable than ex parte seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
enforcement statute broadly authorizes seizure of “[a]ny electronic,
electromagnetic, radio frequency, or similar device, or component
thereof . . . .”165 However, the Supreme Court has held that regulations
interfering with the First Amendment must be “narrowly drawn” to serve
those interests.166 This holding is important considering that streaming
webcasts often accompany over-the-air pirate broadcasts.
Applying the First Amendment to today’s new media formats, the
authority to seize “any and all” electronic equipment is overbroad. For
example, FRSD streamed its live broadcast over the Internet in addition
to over the airwaves. When the FCC and U.S. Marshals seized “any and
all” electronic equipment, they seized computers engaged in the dual use
of broadcasting and webcasting. Lacking equipment, FRSD has not yet
returned to the Internet.167 Because of the enforcement statute’s
overinclusiveness, the FCC silenced protected Internet speech in addition to
enforcing broadcast regulations. The statute could be narrowly drawn
by authorizing the seizure of equipment used only in broadcasting, such
as antennae or amplifiers. Alternatively, the statute might be justified
under exigent circumstances should it apply only upon a showing of
interference.
Ex parte forfeitures involve the greatest intrusions and provide the
least protections for those whose property is at stake. Since many pirate
164. But see, e.g., Grid Radio v. FCC, 278 F.3d 1314, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(imposing a monetary forfeiture, among other remedies). Grid Radio is one of the few
published cases to reflect an FCC forfeiture fine.
165. 47 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2000).
166. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980).
167. Though FRSD’s homepage at http://www.pirate969.org had not been offering
streaming broadcasts as recently as October 2, 2005, that service is now available. (last
visited Oct. 27, 2006).
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radio stations operate from residences,168 courts should also consider the
historically important “sanctity of the home”169 when approving the
appropriateness of ex parte seizures. The three additional congressional
remedies provide less intrusive, albeit imperfect, means to pursue operators
broadcasting without a license. Should pirate broadcasters claim an
additional First Amendment interest in webcasting, the ex parte seizure
statute is not drawn narrowly enough to protect the freedom of speech.
Therefore, in the absence of interference, the FCC should pursue less
intrusive means to enforce licensing regulations.
V. PLEADING THE FIFTH: EX PARTE SEIZURES OF NON-INTERFERING
PIRATE RADIO EQUIPMENT UNDER CURRENT
SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
A. Ex Parte Seizures of Non-Interfering Pirate Radio Conflict
With the Supreme Court’s Mathews Test
Most courts analyze a pirate radio operator’s Fifth Amendment Due
Process concerns under the Supreme Court’s Mathews170 framework.171
In Mathews, the Court emphasized the importance of predeprivation
hearings and constructed a framework to analyze the constitutional
sufficiency of prejudgment seizures.172 Specifically, courts are to
consider three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest in the
procedures, including the administrative burdens that the additional
procedural requirement would entail.173 The growing popularity of dual
use webcasting equipment adds a twist to the first two factors and weighs
against ex parte seizure for non-interfering pirate radio broadcasters.
168. FRSD broadcasted first from a house, and then from an apartment. Tom
Fudge Interview, supra note 14.
169. The Supreme Court has stated that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .” United States v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
170. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414,
422-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Technically, the ex parte enforcement statute, through the
Supplemental Rules, authorizes a court clerk to issue an arrest warrant for seizing
property without a showing of exigent circumstances: “When the United States files a
complaint demanding a forfeiture for violation of a federal statute [like 47 U.S.C. § 301],
the clerk must promptly issue a summons and a warrant for the arrest of the . . . property
without requiring a certification of exigent circumstances. . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. C(3)(a)(i)
(emphasis added).
172. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-35.
173. Id.
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The private interest affected by ex parte seizure is substantial.
Technically, two private interests may exist: a free speech interest and a
property interest in radio equipment. Courts typically dispose of the free
speech interest by relying on NBC’s denial of First Amendment
protection to those broadcasting without a license.174 However,
presumptively protecting non-interfering broadcasts would turn the
private interest into a constitutional right.175 Additionally, dual use
equipment, such as computers, can be used to disseminate legal speech
over the Internet.176 In the presence of dual use technology, the private
First Amendment interest becomes greater.
A private property interest necessarily attaches to expensive electronic
equipment. Even if unlicensed broadcasting falls outside First Amendment
protection, broadcasting equipment itself is not inherently unlawful. For
example, if a court granted an injunction against a pirate operator, the
operator could legally sell his transmitter to a licensed individual.
Moreover, dual use equipment, such as computers, may be seized
although the involvement in pirate radio may be minimal. Arguably, a
strong property interest exists in equipment which either could be legally
used should the owner take steps to get a license or sold to a broadcaster
licensed to use it.
The second Matthews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, cuts
decidedly against pirate broadcasters. Specifically, the risk of erroneously
seizing broadcasting equipment is low. The FCC maintains sophisticated
tracking equipment and broadcasters typically admit to broadcasting
without a license.177 However, as dual use technology becomes more
widespread, pre-seizure hearings could provide additional safeguards
174. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) (holding that
“[t]he right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of
radio without a license.”); see also Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 422
(denying that claimants had any First Amendment interest in broadcasting without a
license).
175. Courts emphasize the importance of First Amendment rights in the due process
context. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“Freedom of speech . . . [is]
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process
clause . . . .”); Grove Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 90 (3d Cir. 1969)
(holding that procedure inhibiting expression as the result of an ex parte hearing violates
the Due Process Clause).
176. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (striking down a law
regulating content on the Internet).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 218
F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2000); Any & All Radio Station Equip, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 418
(denying any violation of the licensing statute).
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over ex parte forfeitures. For example, when the FCC conducts a
prejudgment raid on a structure that includes dual use equipment, the
risk of seizing electronic equipment unrelated to broadcasting increases.
A pirate operator broadcasting simultaneously over the air and Internet
could benefit from a pre-seizure hearing by identifying the use of his
webcasting equipment. Pursuing an injunction against a pirate broadcaster
would have the same effect. Faced with an order to stop broadcasting,
the operator may prefer to stop radio transmission rather than risk
additional “cyber-silence” through seizure of dual-use equipment.
The third and most contested factor concerns the government’s
interest in obtaining an ex parte seizure. The Supreme Court in Fuentes
v. Shevin178 required exigent circumstances to justify the government’s
ex parte seizures, and courts look examine three factors to decide
whether exigent circumstances exist:179 (1) whether seizure is necessary
to secure an important governmental or public interest; (2) the necessity
of very prompt action; and (3) whether a government official initiates
the seizure by applying the standards of a narrowly drawn statute.180
The first Fuentes factor cuts for and against the government. Although
the government has always had a great interest in furthering the utility of
radio, marketplace theory has replaced many regulations with private
choice.181 As such, the public interest in prejudgment seizure is less
clear. If one accepts the idea that non-interfering pirate broadcasters
fulfill core values of diversity and localism,182 public interest requires a
preseizure hearing to ensure a neutral party determines the seizure’s
necessity. Additionally, an ex parte seizure may not be “necessary”
considering other enforcement options.183 Insulating a non-interfering
pirate operator with presumptive First Amendment protection further
weakens the government interest in silencing broadcasters. As Part II
suggests, government withdrawal from spectrum regulation should
correspondingly decrease the intrusiveness of license enforcement.
In the absence of interference, very prompt action is rarely necessary
to pursue unlicensed broadcasters. For example, FRSD operated for
over two years without complaint before the FCC executed an in rem
seizure.184 Another station operating without interference, Free Radio
178. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
179. See, e.g., Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24 (citing
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 92; United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, 971 F.2d
896, 903 (2d. Cir. 1992)).
180. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
181. See supra Part III.B.
182. See supra note 122.
183. The FCC has three options besides ex parte civil forfeiture to deal with an
unlicensed broadcaster. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
184. Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, supra note 1.
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Santa Cruz, operated for almost ten years before the FCC initiated an ex
parte seizure.185 In the case of FRSD, the FCC knew about the station
for months, including the broadcasting location.186 Because the unlicensed
broadcasting did not create any immediate harm, rapid enforcement was
not forthcoming. In other words, exigent circumstances requiring fast,
intrusive remedies did not exist. A showing of interference would justify an
ex parte seizure and vindicate the public interest in receiving intelligible,
licensed broadcasts.187 However, lacking interference, the need for very
prompt action falls away. The remaining enforcement options still
provide enough “teeth” to preserve the integrity of the FCC’s regulatory
mandate.
The FCC enforcement statute broadly authorizing seizure of any and
all electronic equipment188 has been eclipsed by marketplace theory and
dual use technology.189 A broad statute might have been a suitable
punishment for enforcing heavy responsibilities under the public trust
model. However, non-interfering pirate broadcasters pose no immediate
threats to the private parties driving the current regulatory scheme.190
The concerns about dual use technology addressed in Part IV apply
equally here.
A statute limiting seizure to “broadcasting equipment” upon a “showing
of interference” would probably satisfy Fuentes’s “narrowly drawn”
requirement. This would ensure that only operators committing immediate
private harms created exigencies justifying prejudgment seizure. Although
the public interest factor favors both parties, the interests of a noninterfering pirate operator trump governmental interests regarding necessity
of prompt action and a narrowly drawn statute. Therefore, exigent
circumstances generally do not exist in ex parte seizures of non-interfering
185. Interview by Juan Gonzalez & Amy Goodman with George Cadman & Vinny
Lombardo, in Santa Cruz, California (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.
democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=04/09/30/1411235#transcript (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
186. Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14.
187. See United States v. Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
188. See 47 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2000).
189. But see Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (holding that the
licensing statute, 47 U.S.C. § 301, is narrowly drawn enough to initiate a seizure). This
Author respectfully disagrees. While § 301 holds that operators may not broadcast
without a license, 47 U.S.C. § 510(a) is the statute authorizing ex parte seizures. It is
argued that the FCC applies this statute when effectuating a seizure.
190. The only threat to private parties is competition, a goal that FCC policy
traditionally promotes.
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radio equipment. And in the absence of exigent circumstances, courts
generally disfavor ex parte seizures.191
B. Traditional Government Justification of Ex parte Seizures Is Flawed
Typically, the government argues the adequacy of ex parte pirate radio
seizures by pointing to the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co.192 In Calero-Toledo, a drug smuggling case, the government
seized a yacht prior to judicial determination of forfeiture.193 Central to
the Court’s analysis was the fact that a yacht was the sort of property
that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed if
advance warning of confiscation were given.194 However, the concerns
underlying drug cases are inapplicable to that of non-interfering pirate
radio seizures.195 Whereas the government has reason to fear drug smuggling
instruments fleeing jurisdiction, individual pirate radio stations only
exist and thrive in the immediate area. Because most pirate broadcasters
operate low power stations, fleeing the jurisdiction would mean fleeing
their supporting audience. Although seizing the instrumentalities of the
drug trade provides immediate benefits to the public interest,196 the only
people affected by non-interfering pirate radio are those voluntarily
listening to the broadcast. No immediate public interest is furthered by
191. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53-55
(1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice
and hearing, but only in ‘extraordinary situations where some valid government interest
is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’” (quoting Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972))). The Court continued its analysis by describing the
lack of protection an ex parte seizure leaves the owner of property. Id. at 55.
192. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
193. Id. at 664.
194. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 52 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 679).
195. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679.
Thus, for example, due process is not denied when postponement of notice and
hearing is necessary to protect the public from contaminated food; from a bank
failure; or from misbranded drugs.
The considerations that justified postponement of notice and hearing in
[the aforementioned situations] are present here. . . . [S]eizure under the . . .
statutes serves significant governmental purposes: Seizure . . . foster[s] the
public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property . . . .
Id. (citations omitted). Unlike non-interfering pirate radio, each of the mentioned items
can cause immediate public harm.
196. For example, taking a drug boat into custody theoretically reduces the amount
of drugs coming into a community. This increases the community’s well-being,
regardless if they were pro-drug or anti-drug, through lower crime and greater resources
available for other projects. On the other hand, ex parte pirate radio seizures do not
provide any offsetting benefits, other than a vague respect for FCC enforcement
measures. Ex parte seizures directly harm the listening audience, however, by depriving
them of a source of local and diverse broadcasters.
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seizing non-interfering broadcasting equipment. Indeed, silencing pirate
broadcasts through ex parte seizure may contradict the FCC’s public
interest mandate.197
VI. CONCLUSION
Today, the radio industry has developed from a little-understood
novelty to a multibillion dollar industry. Radios are in our homes, cars,
clocks, and showers. Many of us listen to the daily news on the drive to
work and blast music on the ride home. No matter where and when we
listen, we depend on radio as a free source of information and entertainment.
As the regulating body, the FCC enjoys significant influence on what
comes out of the little box with knobs.
While early FCC policy commanded choice over efficiency, marketplace
theory promotes an opposite incentive. Pirate operators and their audiences
argue that the policy shift harms the public’s interest in local and diverse
programming. The strength of this argument lies in the pirate-public
relationship: despite substantial personal risk, pirate stations continue to
operate with strong public support. And without any private harm, they
argue, the only “harm” in unlicensed broadcasting is competition. Ex
parte seizure disproportionately affects the smallest and most diverse
voices on the spectrum; perhaps, these voices need the most protection
today.
The effects of marketplace theory are at odds with the traditional
Supreme Court approach to broadcast regulation. The Court should
either refine NBC’s holding or reaffirm the central tenets under arguments
reflecting the realities of the current regulatory scheme. Relaxing the
primary jurisdiction doctrine would also promote more discussion on
how the changed environment affects the way we use radio to further the
First Amendment.
Ex parte seizure is a powerful tool used to remedy great public harms
and immediate private harms. Given alternative enforcement methods,
less intrusive remedies can still maintain the spectrum’s integrity.
Additionally, non-interfering pirate radio does not pose the inherent
exigencies that warrant ex parte relief.
Finally, the emergence of dual use technology poses a problem with
which courts have not yet dealt. As we have seen, webcasting may

197.

See supra Part III.
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significantly alter the balance of interests under Mathews. Ex parte
seizure is an enforcement remedy which may hurt more than it helps.
VII. AFTERWORD
As this Comment neared completion, the Author regularly checked the
FRSD Web site for updates on the station’s response to the FCC seizure.
As an indication of how strongly the community valued FRSD’s service,
listener donations allowed the station to resume unlicensed, interferencefree broadcasting within three months of the ex parte raid. On
November 21, 2005, Bob Ugly reaffirmed his own commitment by
posting the following on FRSD’s Web site: “on a personal note to the
San Diego FCC, we roll much deeper than you. Take our [expletive]
again, and we’ll only clown you even harder when we come back.”198
BUCK ENDEMANN

198. Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, http://www.pirate969.org/modules.php?name=
News&file=article&sid=43 (November 22, 2005, 21:06:27 PST).
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